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Negligent Retention and
Arbitration: The Effect of a
Developing Tort on Traditional
Labor Law
Terry A. Bethel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some time ago, the American Arbitration Association invited me to participate
in a panel discussion about the potential impact of the negligent retention tort on
labor arbitration. I accepted without admitting that I had never heard of the tort of
negligent retention and had no idea how it could affect arbitration. However,
through some rudimentary research and discussions with my fellow panelists, I was
able to formulate some ideas to share on the appointed date. Not surprisingly, I
accepted the conventional lore that anything which poses a threat to the finality of
the arbitration process would be bad for the system and, therefore, must be
eradicated. Negligent retention, we all concluded, posed such a threat, principally
because of its practical effect on the finality of arbitration awards. We were not
naive enough to believe that we could do away with the tort entirely, but we
suggested that it should have no application when it might have an adverse impact
on arbitration.
Negligent retention is a tort theory that finds employers liable for the wrongful
acts of employees outside the scope of their employment and, consequently, extends
the traditional liability under the respondeat superior theory.' Tort actions against
employers typically have little to do with labor arbitration, a system for resolving
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. J.D., Ohio State University,
1971. The author is a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
1. Respondeat superior holds employers liable for negligent acts committed by employees within the
scope of their employment. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 499-
508 (5th ed. 1984).
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disputes that arise under a collective bargaining agreement.2 Torts generally arise
independently of the contract and recognize some duty allegedly owed by the
tortfeasor to an injured party. Even if the person who caused the harm is an
employee, and even if there are theories for extending liability for the harm to the
employer, it is not easy to see how that poses a threat to arbitration.
What happens, however, if the employee who caused the harm retains
employment - and thereby the opportunity to cause harm - because of an
arbitrator's award? Is the employer still liable under negligent retention, despite its
failed effort to remove the employee from the work force? Is the union liable under
a similar theory for having pressed the case to arbitration and, in effect, causing the
reinstatement? Is the arbitrator who ordered the employee back to work liable?
Does it matter whether the arbitration was the result of a union contract or was
merely a term of an individual employment agreement?
As negligent retention theories continue to grow, courts will inevitably address
these questions. This article will offer a brief introduction to the tort of negligent
retention and related doctrines and will discuss how courts will accommodate them
within traditional labor law principles. Despite my impulsive reaction that negligent
retention poses a threat to arbitration, I conclude that, for the most part, negligent
retention and labor arbitration can coexist peacefully.
II. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT RETENTION
As typically understood, negligent retention and related theories expand liability
to employers for acts committed by employees outside the scope of their
employment. Under respondeat superior, employers generally share liability with
employees for negligent acts, even though employers sometimes argue that
negligence was not within the scope of an employee's duties.3 By contrast, negligent
retention theories are not restricted to employee negligence and do not depend on the
scope of employment limitation that defines liability in respondeat superior. In its
most common application, negligent retention makes employers liable for the
intentional misconduct of their employees, though with an important limitation. The
doctrine is described in section 317 of the Restatement of Torts:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent
him from intentionally harming others ... if
2. A full description of labor arbitration is beyond the scope of this article. For a general review of
the law affecting labor arbitration see GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW,
186-250 (2d ed. 1999) and ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 575-620 & 729-65 (1976). For practical discussion of labor arbitration, see
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin
eds., 5th ed. 1997) and TIM BORNSTEIN & ANN GOSLNE, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION (Tim
Bornstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997).
3. For a discussion of respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious liability, see DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 905-40 (2000).
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises... of the master .... or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.'
Subsection (a) purports to limit the master's liability to circumstances in which the
misconduct takes place on or makes use of the employer's property, a limitation not
always accepted by courts. More important is subsection (b), which requires a
showing that the employer knew or should have known of the danger presented by
an employee. The tort, then, does not necessarily render employers liable for
random or isolated misconduct of employees. Rather, the employer must have some
reason to suspect that such actions might occur.
There are a myriad of cases in which negligent retention theory has been
applied. This article is not an exhaustive review of the tort because the principal
inquiry is the effect such actions might have on labor arbitration. A review of a few
cases is sufficient to highlight the problem. State courts have developed three
different, though related, theories: negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision. The difference is not always clear, especially between
negligent retention and negligent supervision, and in most cases, perhaps it is not a
matter of great importance. There are some cases, however, that make the
distinction.
One of the most frequently cited cases, for example, is Yunker v. Honeywell.5
In that case, the employer rehired an employee, Landin, who, during his previous
tenure, had strangled a coworker to death.6 Ultimately, Landin became infatuated
with another coworker and, when she rebuffed his advances, shot and killed her
outside her home.7
The court said there was no action for negligent supervision, which unlike the
sibling claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention "derives from the
respondeat superior doctrine, which relies on connection to the employer's premises
or chattels."8 The murder did not occur on the employer's premises and Landin did
not use the employers shotgun.9 Nor could the plaintiff recover in negligent hiring.
Both negligent hiring and negligent supervision, the court said, rely on "direct, not
vicarious liability."' ° In other words, they are not based on respondeat superior
theory and do not depend on a claim that the employee acted within the scope of
employment. Instead, the court recognized that such actions are typically based on
the intentional torts of employees committed "outside the scope of employment,
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
5. 496 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
6. Id. at 421.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 422.
9. Id.
10. Id.
2000]
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when the employer knew or should have known that the employee was violent or
aggressive and might engage in injurious conduct."'
Using that standard, the court concluded that negligent hiring was unavailable
because all Honeywell knew when it rehired Landin was that he had been convicted
of and imprisoned for strangling a coworker. 2 The court noted that Landin was a
custodian and that his duties involved no contact with the public and only "limited
contact with coemployees.' ' 3 Although the employee Landin murdered was on his
maintenance crew, the court said she was not a "reasonably foreseeable victim" of
misconduct at the time of Landin's hire. 14 Apparently, this was because she was not
transferred to that position until about three years after Landin was hired. 5
Probably more important to the court's rationale was its conclusion that a contrary
decision would have discouraged employers from hiring applicants with criminal
records, which, the court said, was contrary to the policy favoring rehabilitation. 6
An action would lie, however, for negligent retention. The court noted that
following his rehire in 1984 Landin was twice transferred because of workplace
confrontations.' 7 His difficulties included sexual harassment of female employees,
challenging a male coworker to a fight, threatening to kill another coworker over a
minor traffic accident, "hostile and abusive" behavior toward a female coworker, and
several workplace incidents directed toward the woman he ultimately killed. 8 In
reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent retention
claim, the court said that this course of behavior "show[s] that it was foreseeable that
Landin could act violently against a coemployee."' 9 Given the procedural posture
of the case, the court did not reach the issue of whether Honeywell breached a duty
to protect its employees by failing to fire or discipline Landin.20
Not all negligent retention cases involve claims by coworkers.2' In Frye v.
American Painting Co.,22 for example, the court found that a plaintiff had stated a
cause of action in negligent supervision or negligent retention against an employer
who sent an employee to paint plaintiffs house.' Eleven days after he was hired by
American Painting, employee Robert Hicks burglarized the apartment of his former
girlfriend and set it on fire.24 When the police came to arrest Hicks, he fled in a van
owned by American Painting that he apparently used as a regular part of his
11. Id.
12. Id. at 423.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at421.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Some states, in fact, have limited the usefulness of the action by employees by finding it to be
preempted by worker's compensation statutes. See, e.g., Peterson v. RTM Mid-America, Inc., 434 S.E.
2d 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
22. 642 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. App. 1994).
23. Id. at 999.
24. Id. at 997. Hicks had previously beaten his girlfriend and had a restraining order issued against
him. Id.
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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employment.25 When finally apprehended, Hicks did not have a driver's license and
was found to be in possession of marijuana.26 American Painting continued Hicks'
employment and even promoted him, despite problems with his work performance,
including alcohol abuse. Subsequently, Hicks and his foreman were dispatched to
paint plaintiffs home.2" While there, Hicks discovered some cash and credit cards,
which the foreman told him to return.2 9 Later that evening, Hicks burglarized
plaintiffs home, stole the credit cards, and set fire to the house.30
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing
plaintiffs claims in negligent hiring and retention.3 The appeals court reversed,
noting the remarkable similarity between the crimes Hicks' committed against his
girlfriend and against the plaintiff.32 Most important, the employer was aware of
Hicks' burglary and arson of his girlfriend's apartment, evidence important to proof
of "the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the employee's propensity to
commit a later act of violence."3
In a case applying a similar rationale, the Ohio Court of Appeals overturned a
grant of summary judgment in favor of a hospital sued for negligent hiring and
retention because a male nurse had sexually assaulted a psychiatric patient.3 4 The
doctrine has even been extended to members of the public who are neither coworkers
or customers of the employer. For example, in Faverty v. McDonald's Restaurants
of Oregon,3" the court of appeals upheld a jury verdict finding McDonald's liable for
injuries the plaintiff sustained in an accident with an off-duty employee.3 6 The
employee had worked several overtime shifts over the previous week and, on the
morning of the accident, had asked to go home because he was tired. 7 He fell asleep
on the way home and collided with the plaintiff.3"
The plaintiffs complaint alleged only that McDonald's had been negligent for
working the employee "more hours than was reasonable" when it knew or should
have known that he would drive home and be a hazard to other motorists.39
McDonald's offered several defenses, including a claim of no liability because the
accident occurred off company property and without use of company chattels, and
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 999.
33. Id. at 998. See, e.g., Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding employer liable for both compensatory and punitive damages under a negligent
retention theory where a furniture delivery man returned to the home of a customer, gained entry on false
pretenses and raped and stabbed her and stating that the "ultimate question of liability to be decided is
whether it was reasonable for the employer to permit the employee to perform his job in the light of
information about him which the employer should have known").
34. Wells v. Bowie, 87 Ohio App. 3d 730 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
35. 892 P.2d 703 (Or. App. 1995).
36. Id. at 704-05.
37. Id. at 705.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 706.
2000]
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that McDonald's had no special duty to control its employees' conduct under these
circumstances.40 The court disagreed, citing McDonald's knowledge that the
employee was tired from working long hours and would probably drive home, and
noting that two other employees had been involved in accidents when they fell
asleep driving home after late shifts.4 ' In effect, then, the court sustained liability
under a theory of negligent supervision, since McDonald's had either failed to allow
its employee to gain sufficient rest or, presumably, failed to make arrangements for
getting him home safely.
These and similar cases establish that employers can sometimes be liable for the
wrongful acts of employees, even though the employee clearly acted outside the
scope of his employment. The comment to the restatement says, in fact, that "[t]here
may be circumstances in which the only effective control which the master can
exercise over the conduct of the servant is to discharge the servant."42 In the cases
cited above, the employee had presented some cause for the employer to do just that.
In Yunker the employee had experienced problems with coworkers and in American
Painting the employee had engaged in off-the-job misconduct. Both employees
apparently worked in a nonunion environment, which would have made it easier for
their employers to discharge them.
In order to demonstrate how the tort of negligent retention and the traditional
law of arbitration might intersect, assume that the employees in both cases were
members of bargaining units represented by unions and assume that in each case, the
union had negotiated a requirement that any discharge be for just cause. In the
typical setting, the parties conn-lit the resolution of contract disputes to an arbitrator
whose judgment is final and binding. Suppose, then, that Honeywell discharged
Landin for his workplace confrontations with coworkers and that American Painting
fired Hicks for burglarizing and setting fire to his girlfriend's apartment. Further
suppose that in each case, an arbitrator found there was not just cause for discharge
and ordered the employees reinstated.
These assumptions are not farfetched. Though it is difficult to generalize about
what arbitrators do, it is easy to find cases in which arbitrators have reinstated
employees guilty of significant misconduct. In Startran, Inc. and Amalgamated
Transit Union Local 1091,43 for example, an arbitrator reinstated a bus driver who
had been discharged following convictions for bank robbery and injuring a child.
In City of New Hope and International Union of Operating Engineers," an arbitrator
reinstated a city employee who got drunk at a city-sponsored picnic and both
verbally and physically assaulted a female coworker.45
40. Id. at 707-08. McDonald's cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 317. Id.
41. Id. at 709-10.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317, cmt. c (1965).
43. 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 641 (1995).
44. 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 427 (1987).
45. See also Martin Oil Co. and Automotive Petroleum & Allied Indus. Employees Union Local 618,
29 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 54 (1957) (reinstating employee after shooting his wife in an off-duty domestic
dispute); Claire Pendar Co. & United Steelworkers of Am., Local 6870, 63 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 173
(undated) (reinstating employee charged with the shooting death of his wife).
By citing these cases, I do not mean to criticize the arbitrators' decisions. I have no opinion about how
the cases should have been decided. I cite them only to demonstrate that there are cases in which
employees are reinstated despite being guilty of misconduct.
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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The Restatement of Torts suggests that an employer can guard against liability
in negligent retention by terminating an employee once it discovers the employee's
propensity to cause harm. But what happens when the employer tries that, only to
see the employee reinstated by a third party? Suppose, following his reinstatement,
the bus driver in Startran injured a child passenger on his bus or that the City of New
Hope employee later sexually assaulted a customer or coworker. Would the
employers be liable in negligent retention or for the related theory of negligent
supervision?
One might argue that the employer's act could not be "negligent" because it
attempted to exercise due care but was prevented from doing so by the arbitrator.
But, of course, the arbitrator had the authority to reinstate the employee only because
the employer agreed that she should. Arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements is not mandatory but exists only because the parties have adopted it as
a way of resolving disputes. One might question, then, whether the arbitrator's
action necessarily shields the employer from liability in tort. Even if negligent
retention is unavailable, does the employer's knowledge of the employee's activity --
and the recognition of the dangerous propensity acknowledged by the attempt to
discharge him - mean that the employer now faces liability in negligent
supervision? Should the employer in Startran have placed a supervisor on the bus
in order to insure that the employee would not injure a child? Should American
Painting officials have warned its customer that Hicks had found his cash and credit
cards?
There are no cases that answer these questions. However, if the popularity of
negligent retention continues to grow, one might expect that courts will have to
confront them soon. The matter does not end with the employer's liability.
Employees like Landin and Hicks could never be reinstated without the intervention
of the union and without the arbitrator's decision. Does the union share in the
liability whether or not the employer remains a defendant? Or does the law that
protects labor arbitration require that all state remedies must yield?
A. Liability of the Arbitrator
There are no cases holding an arbitrator liable for damage caused by an
employee the arbitrator reinstated, and it seems safe to suggest that there will be
none. The principle of arbitral immunity will protect arbitrators from liability.
Arbitral immunity is typically invoked in cases in which a disappointed party to the
arbitration - probably most often the unsuccessful employee - sues the arbitrator.
In such cases, courts have immunized arbitrators by extending the doctrine of
judicial immunity, reasoning that the arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.4
One court has described the policy as one which "protect[s] [the arbitrator] from..
46. For a general discussion of arbitral immunity, complete with a bibliography, see the heading under
that title at the web site of the National Academy of Arbitrators (visited Oct. 12, 2000)
<http://www.naarb.org/arb-imm.html>.
2000]
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intimidation caused by fear of a lawsuit arising out of the exercise of official
function[]., 47
Although disappointed litigants have unsuccessfully tried numerous strategies
for circumventing the principle of arbitral immunity, it makes sense to immunize the
decision maker from liability when he or she is asked to resolve a dispute about
which the parties have strong feelings. 4 An adverse decision does not mean that the
arbitrator has made common cause with the other side. It merely means that as
between two conflicting views of the case, the arbitrator has been persuaded that one
is correct. Clearly, the parties who asked the arbitrator to exercise that judgment
should not later be able to attack him merely because they disagree with it. As the
Supreme Court has observed in a different context, the parties have bargained for the
arbitrator's judgment and they are bound by it.49 If they question the arbitrator's
ability to exercise sound judgment, then they can refuse to use the same arbitrator
in future cases.
The same policy should be extended to bar suits by third parties who may be
harmed as a consequence of the arbitrator's decision to reinstate an employee. The
arbitrator, after all, did not hire the employee in the first instance. And the issue in
the arbitration is not whether the employee should have been hired but whether the
employer had sufficient cause to fire him. Though arbitral precedent is typically not
binding from one workplace to another, it is fair to observe that, over time,
arbitrators and litigants alike have come to accept certain concepts. For example, it
is generally understood that an employer does not have just cause to discharge an
employee for off-duty misconduct unless there is some "nexus" between the conduct
and the workplace.5 ° Certainly, reasonable minds disagree about the strength of the
nexus and whether, for example, it might be demonstrated merely by adverse
publicity for the employer. Nevertheless, these are the sorts of disputes that parties
commonly commit to arbitration with the understanding that they will be bound
(happily or not) by the result.
Similar concepts apply in other types of cases. Thus, the parties expect that in
discharge cases an arbitrator will be influenced by the treatment afforded similarly
47. Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1208 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Wally v.
General Council of the Textile and Apparel Industry, a Division of Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 165 Misc.
2d 896, 897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
48. See, e.g., Dennis R. Nolan and Roger I. Abrams, The Arbitrator's Immunity From Suit and
Subpoena, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
149, 155-68 (1988).
49. This rationale is most often invoked in cases of judicial review, where one of the parties alleges
that the arbitrator's award was incorrect. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'al Union v. Misco, 484 U.S.
29 (1987). The Court noted that the employer claimed the arbitrator had "committed grievous error" in
his failure to find that an employee had used marijuana on company property. Id. at 39. The Court
found, "only improvident, even silly, factfinding is claimed. Id. This is hardly a sufficient basis for
disregarding what the agent appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts." Id.
In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Court
explained its policy of limited judicial review of arbitrators' awards by saying, "It is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for, and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is
different than his." Id. at 599.
50. See, e.g., BORSTEIN AND GOSLINE, supra note, 3 at §§ 16.09 & 19.05. See also THE COMMON
LAW OF THE WORKPLACE § 6.6 (Theodore J. St. Antoine, ed., 1998).
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
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situated employees, by an employee's length of service and previous disciplinary
record, and maybe even by so-called marketplace factors, like an employee's age or
family responsibilities." Again, reasonable people disagree about the circumstances
under which these criteria should apply and about the weight to be afforded them in
particular cases. But it is fair to conclude that they are part of the foundation of the
just cause requirement.
Arbitrators should be free to apply these criteria without fear that their efforts
will result in liability to strangers to the agreement. Arbitrators work within a private
contractual relationship and their task is not to frame the parties' commitments but
only to enforce them. There is a legitimate debate in the arbitral community about
whether arbitrators should enforce agreements that are contrary to law.52 But there
is no legitimate argument that arbitrators should be able to make policy decisions for
the contracting parties. Thus, while an arbitrator may be expected to apply concepts
of nexus, seniority, and disparate treatment in a discharge case; the parties do not
expect her to establish general criteria for hiring or retention. Nor should her own
liability be a principal concern. Rather, the arbitrator should merely interpret the
contract and leave its implementation to the parties.
B. Liability of the Employer
In a landmark 1957 decision, the Supreme Court established both that the law
of labor arbitration is federal law and that agreements to arbitrate are specifically
enforceable.53 Both decisions were matters of some controversy at the time.-
Private sector employment contracts are typically seen as matters of state law.
Moreover, state courts had not been particularly receptive of agreements to arbitrate
disputes that were not enforceable at common law. Nevertheless, the Court sought
to protect arbitration as a method of settling labor-management disputes by wresting
control of the process away from hostile state courts.
In form, at least, subsequent decisions have added to that protection. The
celebrated Steelworkers' Trilogy narrowed the function of courts both in determining
whether parties had agreed to arbitrate a dispute and in reviewing the results of the
arbitration. 5 Subsequent decisions have, in the main, reaffirmed that commitment
51. For a review of some of the factors that influence arbitrators in discharge cases, see ELKOURI,
supra note 3, at 910-39.
52. See. e.g., Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42 (1968); Stephen L. Hayford, Labor
Arbitration and External Law: A Contemporary View, THE CHRONICAL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS (Jan. 1997); David Feller, External Law and the Labor Arbitrator: An Old Fashioned
View, THE CHRONICAL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (May 1997); Stephen L. Hayford,
Labor Arbitration and External Law: A Reconciliation? THE CHRONICAL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS (Sept. 1997).
53. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 488 (1957).
54. For an overview of the debate concerning the role of law in arbitration see Hary Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955) and Archibald Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274 (1948).
55. The Steelworkers Trilogy involves three cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same day.
The United Steelworkers of America was a party to each case. A complete discussion of the cases is
beyond the scope of this article. The cases are United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
2000]
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to arbitration, though there is some reason to question whether the lower federal
courts share the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for the process. 56 Included in the
federal decisions protecting arbitration are cases in which the Court has found state
law actions to be preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,1
7
which favors resolution in the arbitral forum. One question that might arise, then,
is whether a state court negligent retention action could be preempted if the tort
feasor had been returned to employment by an arbitration under the auspices of §
301. Cases dismissing lawsuits in favor of arbitration have involved attempts by
employees to enforce judicially contract rights that the parties agreed would be
settled in arbitration. The theory of those cases would not necessarily extend to
actions filed by coworkers using a negligent retention theory and certainly would not
extend to customers or other members of the public who are not party to the
collective bargaining agreement.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck" is an apt example. An injured employee sued
his employer alleging that the employer had unreasonably interfered with the
payment of disability benefits provided by an insurance carrier pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement between Allis-Chalmers and the plaintiffs union."
Wisconsin allowed such actions in tort for bad faith handling of an insurance claim
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court had ruled that the employee's claim was not
preempted by the arbitration provisions of the labor contract.' The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claim was actually grounded in the
collective bargaining agreement, because that document created the contractual right
to benefits and disputes over those rights were an arbitrable issue under the
agreement.61 The Court noted that preemption of essentially contractual claims was
essential to protect the parties' arbitration scheme. 62 However, it also observed that
§ 301 does not preempt suits under state rules that regulate conduct or establish
rights independent of contract.
63
Obviously, negligent retention actions by customers and members of the public
(like American Painting) do not depend on any rights created by the collective
bargaining agreement. Those documents create rights among the contracting parties
- the employer and the union - and for the employees the union represents. They
do not affect rights created by state law for strangers to the agreement. Not all of the
potential plaintiffs, however, are strangers. Although not all coworkers will be
363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
56. A persistent complaint of scholars has been the willingness of lower federal courts to set aside
arbitrators' awards, which is said to undermine the utility of arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 25, 25-39
(1988).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
58. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). For a more detailed review of this decision, see Terry A. Bethel, Recent
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 45 MD. L. REV. 179, 185-91 (1986).
59. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 at 206.
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. at 220-21.
62. Id. at 219-20.
63. Id. at 212.
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covered by the collective bargaining agreement, some will. In Yunker, for example,
the injured party would almost certainly have been a member of the same bargaining
unit as Landin, her murderer.' Does a negligent retention action by her estate
against the employer actually seek to enforce contract rights found in the collective
bargaining agreement?
Most labor contracts have language recognizing the employer's obligation to
provide a safe work environment. It seems likely that the parties who negotiate such
language probably intend it to apply generally to safe equipment and facilities. But
it is not much of a stretch to apply such provisions to dangerous employees. Thus,
an employer who fails to investigate the background of workers, or who retains them
after notice of dangerous propensities, may violate the obligation to provide "for the
safety and health of its employees. 65 It is surely not the case, however, that only
unionized employers have such an obligation. Nor is it clear that the obligation
under a health and safety clause in a collective bargaining agreement would surpass
any such obligation that exists at common law. If the state imposes such an
obligation independent of contract law, the preemption principles should not apply.
In addition, the kind of action at issue raises practical questions about the utility
of having arbitration preempt the employee's negligent retention claim. Arbitrators
have - or at least claim - expertise in resolving contract disputes between
employers and unions. They regularly adjudicate claims dealing with seniority,
disparate treatment, just cause and similar matters. A facility for resolving such
claims, however, does not necessarily mean that arbitrators should decide the extent
of an employer's obligation to investigate the background and monitor the on- and
off-duty activities of its workers, some of whom are not even members of the
bargaining unit represented by the union. This is not to say that arbitrators cannot
resolve such cases. Arbitrators hear cases with varied factual content and with
diverse contractual arguments. Their job is to settle disputes and the survival of the
institution may be evidence that they do so adequately. But their success with the
typical fodder of labor contracts does not mean that they should be imposed on
plaintiffs with different types of claims. States have a legitimate interest in insuring
that employers meet some minimum standards of safety in the workplace. Negligent
retention theory is one way, though not the only one, of working out the parameters
of that obligation. Labor arbitrators have no role to play in that accommodation, no
matter what their value might be in resolving contractual disputes under collective
bargaining agreements.
Even if traditional preemption arguments do not apply, however, advocates for
arbitration have a strong policy argument for limiting an employer's liability in
negligent retention when an arbitrator has reinstated the offending worker. Though
proponents of labor arbitration point to several benefits, most would probably agree
that it is the system's finality that most enhances its utility. In the Steelworkers
Trilogy, the Supreme Court announced that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
64. Yunker, 496 N.W. 2d 419.
65. See Agreement Between Inland Steel Co. & United Steelworkers of Am., Indiana Harbor Works,
art. 14, 114.1 (August 1, 1993) (on file with author).
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bargaining agreements." Although the Court has had occasion to remind the lower
federal courts of this principle more than once 67 (and though some courts seem still
not to have heard the advice), it was clearly intended to foster the finality of the
arbitrator's award. The idea is that, unlike typical litigation in which cases can drag
on for years amidst appeals, reversals, retrials, more appeals and the like, an
arbitration award resolves the dispute once and for all. In theory, the finality of the
process eases the disruption and unrest that accompanies workplace disputes.
Because arbitration awards are simply a matter of contract interpretation, an unhappy
party can try and undo the effects of an unfavorable award in the next round of
collective bargaining.
At first glance, a state tort action in negligent retention has little to do with
arbitration, even if the plaintiff seeks to recover for the actions of an employee
reinstated by an arbitrator. The action does not directly attack the arbitration and if
the plaintiff prevails that does not reverse the arbitrator's decision. The employee
may not be a party to the action, and, even if he is, the state court that hears the tort
claim would have no authority to interfere in the employee's employment status.
But the problem is more complicated than that. In the typical negligent
retention case, the employer will have done what it can to neutralize the dangerous
employee by firing him. A tort action on account of the employee's conduct after
reinstatement does not nullify the arbitrator's award, but it leaves the employer
exposed to harm that it may not be able to avoid. Does it make sense to apply a tort
doctrine that is intended in part to deter employer conduct when the employer's
retention of the employee was forced by an outside agency? Of course, it could be
that the employee had manifested some dangerous behavior even before he was
hired that the employer could have discovered with adequate investigation. Not all
cases will be like that; an employee may develop - or at least first demonstrate -
dangerous propensities only after he is hired.
There are, however, also powerful arguments for the plaintiff. While it may be
that the employer had no choice but to reinstate the dangerous employee, it is hardly
the fault of the injured party. It would have been small comfort to the woman
Landin killed in the Yunker case to know that an arbitrator ordered him reinstated
over the employer's objection. From a public policy standpoint, the employer is still
better able to guard against violence than an individual employee and is clearly
better able to spread the risk that something might happen. In short, as between two
innocent parties, the injured employee makes a better claim for protection than the
employer.
Nor can one argue forcefully that allowing employer liability for negligent
retention will undermine the federal policy favoring arbitration. The Supreme Court
has explained that arbitration's favored status stems from a desire to avoid industrial
strife.6' The.conventional wisdom is that the integrity - and the finality - of the
arbitral forum must be protected to insure that employees have an outlet for their
66. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
67. For two cases that reinforce the Enterprise Wheel decision, see United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) and W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
68. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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frustrations other than the strike. Arbitration promises a peaceful and reasonably
expeditious means of settling workplace disputes short of more disruptive measures.
The Court has looked askance at threats to the finality of that system, like excessive
judicial review.
This policy is not threatened by allowing employees and others to pursue
negligent retention claims against employers who have been forced to retain
dangerous workers. Arbitration's advocates have urged, both before courts and the
NLRB, that any interference with the authority of arbitrators or with the policy of
finality will dampen the enthusiasm that employers and unions have for the arbitral
process. Perhaps real obstacles to arbitration would undermine the system, though
the willingness of employers and unions to resort to arbitration seems not to have
been hindered by other cries of wolf. In any event, there is no reason for even the
most zealous proponents of arbitration to believe that the limited incursion on
arbitral values posed by potential negligent retention claims would have any impact
at all on arbitration. Employers and unions will still disagree about seniority issues,
about promotions and layoffs, and about the propriety of disciplinary action. They
will still need a system to resolve these disputes and the chance of an occasional tort
claim for negligent retention will not destroy what has been a useful process for
more than fifty years.
C. Liability of Unions
If one takes the position that unionized employers should not be immunized
from negligent retention lawsuits, then it seems anomalous to suggest that unions
should be. The employer reinstated the offending employee, after all, only because
the union pressed the case to arbitration. Moreover, there is no doubt that the union
has some discretion in that endeavor. Federal law does not compel that the union
take all cases to arbitration and can shield it from liability even if it refuses to
arbitrate a valid claim.6 9 If the union refuses to take the case, individual employees
typically have no right to arbitrate cases on their own. Cases are heard in arbitration,
then, only because the union decided to press the dispute to that forum. What
justification could there be for exempting unions from liability when they, in effect,
forced the employer to rehire the tortfeasor employee?
There are at least two considerations. In the first place, the discharge arbitration
is normally understood as a forum in which the employer is forced to prove that it
had just cause to terminate an employee. Without pressing the analogy too far, a
union's decision to arbitrate is similar to a not guilty plea in a criminal proceeding.
Such a plea does not mean that a defendant proclaims innocence; it merely means
that he requires the state to prove his guilt. Similarly, in a discharge arbitration, the
employer has the burden of proof and must establish in a hearing de novo that its
action was justified by sufficient cause. Viewed in that light, the union's decision to
arbitrate does not "force" the employee back on the employer. It merely requires a
showing by the employer that it has sufficient reason to terminate his employment.
69. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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The second consideration concerns the union's duty of fair representation. As
noted above, unions have some discretion in deciding whether to prosecute
grievances to arbitration. Nevertheless, they must act with the knowledge that they
are the discharged employee's exclusive representative, and, in most cases, they
control access to the only forum available. Exclusive representation is of
considerable benefit for unions, but it carries burdens as well. Although the union
can refuse to take to arbitration cases of questionable merit or cases without
significant benefit to the unit it represents, one might question whether the union
should determine whether employees are suitable for employment.
This is not to suggest that a union could not refuse to prosecute a case for a
paroled ax murderer. However, it should not have the burden of determining
whether an employee with emotional problems poses a danger to coworkers or the
public. The union typically has little to do with hiring decisions. Employers decide
whom to hire and they collect information about applicants that is not shared with
the union. Unlike the employer, the union exercises no choice about its relationship
with an employee. As exclusive representative, the union represents employees who
do not belong to or support the organization, and even those who do not want
representation.7 ° In short, unions represent the employees the employer decides to
include in the work force. Unions should not share in the civil liability that might
attend one of those decisions when they have no discretion about hiring and when
federal law requires them to represent all employees.
One might also question the effect of imposing liability on unions. The
possibility that they might share liability when dangerous employees are returned to
the workplace would undoubtedly influence a union's decision about whether to
advance certain cases to arbitration. This would mean that a private agency would
exercise significant control over employment opportunities, influenced not by public
policy but instead by concerns over its own liability. For example, a significant
public policy issue - reflected in some of the cases - is the desirability of allowing
released prisoners to return to the workplace. No one doubts that this is a
controversial matter and that there are risks involved. However, courts are
accustomed to finding solutions that balance and accommodate competing interests.
Even if such decisions are not always satisfactory, they are better made by an agency
whose principal concern is public policy and not its own financial security.
On a more practical level, there could be an impact on the union's obligation to
act as exclusive representative. The words "exclusive representative" mean just what
they say. Employees who are discharged or disciplined have no right to an attorney
in the grievance-arbitration process, save one the union might retain. Even then,
there is some question about whether the lawyer represents the union or the
employee, whose interests do not always coincide. If the union can be liable for the
subsequent misconduct of those it represents in arbitration, it will undoubtedly affect
the employee-union relationship.
Suppose the union's concern about its own liability causes an investigation that
reveals misconduct or personality traits not known to the employer. Will the union
be required to disclose the information in order to avoid liability? Such knowledge
70. For a discussion of the principle of exclusive representation, see GORMAN, supra note 3, at 374-
98.
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would usually not be shielded by an attorney-client privilege, because unions often
use local or international representatives as arbitration advocates. Even when unions
hire an attorney, she would seldom participate in the grievance process, which is
when most of the union's investigation and most of the settlement negotiation with
the employer would occur. If they are to share in liability for employee misconduct,
unions will then be forced to view members as potential adversaries and not as
comrades in an economic struggle with the employer. This would not only dilute the
effect of union representation for the employees, but it could also diminish the
protection available under collective agreements, because the employees have no
right to other representation.
D. Negligent Retention and Employment Arbitration
Employment arbitration is ordinarily understood to mean arbitration of
individual employment claims in a non-union setting. Unlike traditional labor
arbitration, employment arbitration is not necessarily regulated by federal law, and,
even if it is, it is not subject to the body of law developed by the federal courts under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Those cases treat arbitration as a
part of the collective bargaining process and many of them are intended to enhance
the union's status as exclusive representative. In employment arbitration, however,
there is no collective agreement and no union. However, the fact that typical federal
principles do not apply does not compel a different accommodation between
arbitration and the tort of negligent retention.
If labor arbitration is the substitute for a strike, as the conventional wisdom
holds, then employment arbitration is simply the substitute for traditional litigation.
In a non-union setting there is no realistic threat of a strike, especially when the
matter in dispute is the discipline meted out to a single employee. The erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine, however, has given rise to employment claims based
on a variety of theories. Not uncommonly, those claims are funneled to arbitration,
a forum chosen, perhaps, because of labor arbitration's success in settling
disciplinary claims or because employers (who control the employment relationship)
feel more comfortable in arbitration than in court.
In any event, when employees and employers arbitrate a claim of wrongful
discharge, they use arbitration as a substitute for whatever right the employee has to
pursue the claim in state court. No one would suggest that a state court judge suffer
liability for the subsequent misconduct of an employee she reinstates. The arbitrator
who sits in lieu of the judge should have the same immunity from suit. Though one
might question the tactics employers use to procure arbitration agreements from their
employees, the arbitrator in employment arbitration sits in a quasi-judicial capacity
and should be free to act as the circumstances of the case dictate.
Nor is there any reason to exempt an employer from negligent retention liability
just because the case is heard in employment, as opposed to labor, arbitration. In
fact, the most persuasive arguments for limiting employer liability involve
preservation of the arbitral forum under collective bargaining agreements.
Obviously, those interests are not present in a non-union setting. Whether reinstated
by a court or an arbitrator, the employee first gained employment as a result of the
employer's action. Persons injured by the employee's misconduct should not be
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denied compensation because of the employer's failure to investigate thoroughly or
supervise properly after the employee is reinstated.
III. CONCLUSION
I have no quarrel with the conventional wisdom (at least among my fellow
arbitrators) that arbitration is a useful and efficient method of settling disputes in the
workplace. And, like other arbitration proponents, I worry about legal developments
that pose threats to the system, even if some of the perceived hazards prove to be
insubstantial. I also recognize that state court litigation can sometimes undermine
rights that were intended to be enforced only in collectively bargained procedures.
That does not mean, however, that the states have no interest in devising remedies
for those injured by the negligence or deliberate acts of employees. The fact that
some of the remedies might run against employers is not a threat to the arbitral
process.
Although negligent retention suits may occur after employees have been
reinstated by arbitrators, there is no reason to nullify the protection that tort provides
to those injured by employees whose dangerous propensities were known. The
overwhelming number of arbitration cases - even those involving discharge - will
never result in such litigation. There is no reason to suspect that the possibility of
liability will discourage employers from entering into agreements to arbitrate.
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